

JFACC AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE 2 D3 [DRAFT – WIP]

1. SITUATION

a. JFC guidance (verbatim).

Priority of effort is on establishing Air Superiority in support of LCC and set conditions for own operations.

- Start shaping for phase 2 in the operation (Create permissive environment).
- Continue support to LCC
- Be prepared to prepare contingency plans for striking Syrian WMD at short notice (regardless of phase). Expect this plan to be asked for prior to commencing phase 2. ALR: HIGH approved for such a plan.

b. Enemy situation.

The current enemy situation is defined in VIS INTSUM D2, available at OPAR BRIEF.


c. Friendly situation (by joint force component).

Land Component Command (LCC)

IV Corps

The 55th Mechanized Division has secured HATAY and have moved forward battalions to screening positions along the FLOT.

The 56th Armor Division has its' forward elements at the outskirt of Gaziantep. The 56th is preparing for the assault at Gaziantep airfield that will commence in the morning hours of D4.



Turkish local forces

The Turkish 33rd Brigade protecting the Ataturk Dam have been defeated by Syrian forces despite heavy resistance and support from JFACC with CAS.

- Turkish local forces are in static defensive positions and are not in a position to assume offensive operations.
- Turkish local forces consist of BTR-80 and M-113s vehicles
- Turkish local forces are reinforced with coalition JTACs to support with CAS to defend
- against Syrian attacks.

Maritime Component Command (MCC)

CSG-1 continues to support the mission from CSG-1 operations box. SAG 1 remains outside the AO, having been directed to support shipping movements elsewhere following the loss of a Coalition logistics ship carrying GBUs.

Special Operations Component Command (SOCC)

SOF teams are standing by to support with reconnaissance as required and requested by JFACC.

- SOF teams are also on standby to conduct counter terrorism missions and counter insurgency operations.

2. MISSION - The JFACC's mission statement (verbatim).

JFACC will establish air superiority in the area of operations and defeat Syrian offensive capability in support of CJTF-82 offensive operations to neutralize Syrian offensive capability to conduct offensives in the region.

3. EXECUTION - AIR OPERATIONS

JFACC's Intent ATO 3.1 JFACCs intent is to ensure the destruction of known and suspected SA-6 and SA-3 batteries located East of Aleppo (intel references OPAR-D2.2-014 and OPAR D2.2-003 refer, as well as plotted possible SA-3 battery south-east of Abu al-Duhur) in order to reduce the threat of SAMs to friendly aircraft operating in the north of the AO; the intent being to create a permissive route for friendly aircraft to 1) Purpose transit to Jirah and Tabqa ABs to conduct strike operations there. In addition, flights will be conducted to perform AR in the east of Killbox DA to locate 2nd Corps units that may be encamped or moving and in Killbox BC. The coast north of Bassel Al-Assad will be swept to locate and destroy Silkworm batteries that may pose a threat to friendly shipping. Finally, AR taskings will be conducted to locate and destroy Syrian Navy units at sea. 2) End State The end state of this ATO sees the possibility unimpeded passage of friendly aircraft to Jirah and Tabqa Airbases alongside the likelihood of safe passage by sea from the direction of the Suez Canal to Iskenderun. **ATO 3.2** 1) Purpose This second ATO for D3 seeks to deny the enemy the use of Tabga – Tabqa contains a significant number of enemy squadrons that pose a significant threat to friendly air operations. 'Denying the use' of Tabqa represents the total destruction of the airfield - it should not be considered reparable within the time frame of the campaign. Air Interdiction sorties should take place against food production and storage infrastructure located in Idlib - SYTGT114 and SYTGT116 should be destroyed. Additionally, Al should be conducted against positions identified in ATO 3.1, with a focus on artillery batteries, MLRS systems and C2 infrastructure. AR should take place along the FLOT in the vicinity of Gaziantep in order to attrit enemy SHORAD, artillery and MLRS capability.

2) End State

The end state for ATO 3.2 sees Tabqa unable to be used by enemy forces, alongside the significant reduction in the threat posed by enemy long range weaponry. Shipping to Iskenderun should be considered safe from shore-based weaponry.

Execution What to

do, when. – Any detailed instructions if needed

ATO 3.1

- An escorted SEAD strike should seek to prosecute the identified SAM emplacements. No coordination is expected in light of this.
- BARCAP should be established in order to provide protection to flights operating both within and west of Killbox DA.
- A single AR-capable flight should be allocated to Killbox DA keypads 2 and 4. There are no time restrictions on the availability of this killbox, but coordination should take place to ensure that BARCAP is effective before the Killbox is entered.
- A single AR-capable flight should be allocated to scan the coast for Silkworm batteries, to remain clear of Killbox DA. Coordination should take place to ensure that BARCAP is effective before AR commences.
- A single flight capable of conducting operations to locate and destroy Syrian Navy units at sea should be allocated.
 Coordination should take place to ensure that BARCAP is effective before AR commences.

ATO 3.2

A suitably sized strike package should be established, consisting of Sweep, SEAD and strike elements sufficient to ensure the protection of the package and facilitate the necessary destruction of Tabqa AB. Additionally, BARCAP should be established to protect the ingress and egress route for the strike package from attacks from the South, should any Syrian QRA response to be triggered.

A second BARCAP flight should be established to protect friendly forces conducting AR in the vicinity of Gaziantep.

Focus of effort by objective

In accordance with JFACC objectives 1.1 and 1.2, this AOD seeks to reduce the threat posed by enemy aircraft whilst simultaneously reducing the threat posed by SAM batteries. The majority of sorties in this both ATOs will be directed in support of these objectives.

Additional sorties will be allocated to:

- 1.3 Deny Syrian long-range missile artillery ability to affect operations in Turkey.
- 2.3 Destroy C2 capabilities supporting Syrian offensive into Turkey
- 2.5 Affect the will to fight from the Syrian Armed Forces
- Protecting Allied shipping

Acceptable level of

The accepted level of risk throughout this AOD is MEDIUM, other

mining /incolvention or form	Ab and
risk. (including for	than:
AWACS and	 DEAD efforts in ATO 3.1 targeting SA-11 and SA-3 sites
tankers: forward or	should accept HIGH RISK.
rear)	 The strike package tasked with denying the use of Tabqa in
	ATO 3.2 should accept HIGH RISK.
Collateral damage	Every attempt should be taken to minimise collateral damage in the
and civilian	execution of these missions.
casualty guidance	
	Suspected civilian casualties should be reported as soon as is
	practicable.
TST guidance	Where they are identified, items from the TST matrix must be
	prosecuted. The outcome should be reported on the in-flight report
	net.
Intelligence,	All intelligence and BDA should be submitted via Campaign Manager,
Surveillance,	and necessary images placed in #bda-reports on discord IAW SPINS.
Reconnaissance	
(ISR) – If any effort	The following ISRs should be supported in this AOD:
should be done to	 Can the location of the Kilo class Submarine be determined?
support VIS with	2. Are Silkworm Missile Batteries located along the Syrian coast?
ISR to answer	3. IR9 – Location of IADS SAMs
information gaps	4. IR12 – Confirm presence and origin of Syrian QRA
from VIS.	IR17 – Confirm the presence and type of Russian or Syrian
	naval units at sea
	6. IR14 – Confirm presence and type of air defence IVO Tartus
	7. IR2 – Location of 2 nd Corps Rocket Arty Bns
	8. IR7 – Location of 21 st Mech DIV and 22 nd Mot DIV and
	disposition of manoeuvre units
Other issues	N/A
Direction and	Aircrews must remain clear of Jordanian airspace at all times.
Guidance	Munitions must not be expended which may encroach on Jordanian
	airspace.
	Munitions may not be expended in the direction of Basel Al Assad
	And Tartarus in order to avoid Russian involvement in the conflict.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Due to other ongoing major military operations, the munitions are limited in accordance with the 'available ordnance' publication available at OPAR Brief. Further limitations may be imposed by JFACC and will be detailed in the ATO.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

There are no known, specific C2 considerations for these missions. Refer to the Command, Control and Communications section of the JAOP.